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SIGNIFICANT MONTANA CASES
Victoria Hill, Eric Monroe & Marti A. Liechty*

I. INTRODUCTION
The business of the Montana Supreme Court has increased in volume,
but not necessarily in scope, since its inception.1 The Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction.2 The inaugural term of the Court was held in
Virginia City on May 17, 1865.3 It was not until Montana achieved statehood in 1889, and adopted its first constitution, that the judicial system
expanded significantly—augmenting the Supreme Court’s bench to three
members, each serving a six-year tenure.4 The number of seats on the bench
has slowly increased over time, most recently in 1979, from which point
forward the Montana Supreme Court’s bench has maintained seven members.5
Significant Montana Cases is a recurring legal short in the Montana
Law Review in which staff members attempt to select the most impactful
Montana Supreme Court decisions from the previous term, and then explain
the expected impact and breadth of those decisions. As a general matter, the
Montana Supreme Court tends to decide cases that require further discussion, clarification, or analysis. The authors used largely the same criterion
in the diligent selection of which decisions to feature here.6
Broadly, 2021 brought a presidential inauguration,7 COVID-19 management,8 and headline-grabbing jury verdicts.9 At home, Montanans spent
* Montana Law Review Staff Members 2021–22.
1. A Montana Supreme Court Overview for Students, MONTANA JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://
perma.cc/CT28-WGL9 (last visited March 27, 2022) [hereinafter Montana Supreme Court Overview].
2. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(1).
3. Montana Supreme Court Overview, supra note 1 (noting that the first Chief Justice, Hezekiah
L. Hosmer was appointed by President Abraham Lincoln on June 30, 1864).
4. Id. (noting that Montana achieved statehood on November 8, 1889).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/
WD4M-MVED.
8. See, e.g., Alexander Tin, FDA authorizes first antiviral pill to treat COVID-19, CBS NEWS
(Dec. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/SG59-45PP.
9. See, e.g., Connor Donevan & Brianna Scott, Jury Finds Derek Chauvin Guilty On All Counts In
Killing George Floyd, NPR (Apr. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/T4LD-DNME; James Fanelli & Corinne
Ramey, Ghislaine Maxwell Found Guilty in Epstein Sex-Abuse Case, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec.
29, 2021, available at https://perma.cc/6Y3T-EGLB; Theranos Founder Elizabeth Holmes Found Guilty
of Investor Fraud, N.D. CAL. U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, DOJ (Jan. 4, 2022), https://perma.cc/QZL2-7YNE.
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2021 continuing to experience and navigate life in “precedented times.”10 In
the midst of these events, the Montana Republican Party regained control of
the house, senate, and governorship for the first time since 2003, and subsequently churned out a tremendous amount of new law—more than 700 bills
were passed11—many of which have resulted in an influx of litigation in
Montana courts.12 Meanwhile, the Montana Supreme Court similarly broke
unprecedented ground, issuing decisions that have transformed the entirety
of Montana’s legal landscape. Only a handful of those decisions will be
recapitulated here.
II.

STATE V. PHAM13

In State v. Pham, the Montana Supreme Court held that an agent’s
arrest of a Vietnamese man based solely on his staring at the abnormal sight
of a Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) van full of marijuana was unconstitutional.14 The Montana Supreme Court thereby remanded the case back to
the district court in Custer County with an order reversing the judge’s decision that Pham was not seized, which had allowed prosecutors to use as
evidence the 19 pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of the car that Pham
was driving.15
In August 2017, Hoang Vinh Pham drove from his home in Minnesota
to Butte, Montana, to check on a vehicle he had wrecked.16 Pham stopped
at a Conoco gas station off the interstate in the eastern Montana town of
Miles City.17 While there, he went into the gas station to use the restroom,
pay for gas, and heat up a bowl of noodles in the store’s microwave.18
Agent Richard Smith and two uniformed MHP troopers were about to
drive from Miles City to Billings to transport approximately 960 pounds of
marijuana for evidence storage in a three-quarter-ton, full-sized utility van
with panels and windows on the side.19 Agent Smith was dressed in civilian
clothes, carried a gun in a leg holster, and wore a necklace carrying his
10. See Dillon J. Mims, PRECEDENTED TIMES (2021) (a podcast “about America’s past, America’s
present, and how it all seems to be repeating itself,” setting out to “disprove the notion that we are living
through ‘unprecedented times’ ”).
11. Eric Dietrich, Laws on Trial: Where Montana’s bill challenges stand now, MONT. FREE PRESS
(Dec. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/8DLG-3XHW.
12. Eric Dietrich, Laws on Trial, MONT. FREE PRESS (Feb. 18, 2022), https://perma.cc/MH4RERL6.
13. 497 P.3d 217 (Mont. 2021).
14. Id. at 224.
15. Id. at 221, 224.
16. Id. at 219.
17. Brief of Appellant at 4, State v. Pham, 497 P.3d 217 (Mont. 2021) (No. DA 19-0421).
18. Pham, 497 P.3d at 219.
19. Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 4–5.
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Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) badge.20 The officers stopped at
the Conoco station before starting their journey.21 When Agent Smith entered the Conoco, he noticed Pham looking out the station window, staring
at the police van.22
Smith and the two MHP troopers approached Pham after Pham had
returned to his car to pump gas.23 Agent Smith testified that he believed
Pham was either lost or committing a crime based on the length of time that
Pham was staring at the police van.24 Agent Smith denied that Pham’s
Vietnamese ethnicity factored into his decision to approach Pham, but acknowledged that he was aware of several arrests of Vietnamese people for
drug trafficking traveling along the same route.25 The parties disagree about
what happened next.26
At his hearing on his motion to suppress, Pham testified that since
moving to the United States in 1983, he primarily speaks Vietnamese with
friends and family.27 Pham testified that an officer in uniform “came close
to [Pham] and asked [him], ‘Well, you managed to run away[,]’” which
confused Pham.28 (Agent Smith asserted at the motion to suppress hearing
that he recognized Pham from an accident in Butte where “a Black male
and an Asian male had run from the scene.”29) When defense counsel asked
Pham whether he believed he was free to leave, Pham responded, “They did
not let me go anywhere. They kept me in there and they pulled me away
even though I tried to pump gas. So I did not do anything against them.”30
Pham denied opening his car door or trunk to allow Agent Smith to search
the vehicle and testified that Agent Smith “did not ask me and I did not
consent and he kept me there and he did it by himself.”31 Pham indicated
that Agent Smith opened the trunk, but he was unaware whether Agent
Smith used the key or a button in the car to do so.32
The State asserts a very different description of the events.33 Agent
Smith testified that Pham voluntarily engaged in conversation that Agent
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Pham, 497 P.3d at 219.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 4.
Pham, 497 P.3d at 219.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 6.
Pham, 497 P.3d at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 32.
Pham, 497 P.3d at 220.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 220–22.
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Smith characterized as “very cordial.”34 Agent Smith asked Pham if he was
lost, and then asked about Pham’s family and reason for travel.35 Agent
Smith testified that he was aware that Vietnamese culture teaches deference
to police, but he believed his conversation with Pham was different from “a
lot of ethnic conversations” because Pham looked Agent Smith in the eye,
and Agent Smith did not believe he needed to tell Pham he was free to
leave.36 Agent Smith testified that Pham voluntarily opened his rear door
and trunk and allowed Agent Smith to search the vehicle.37 Agent Smith
found several boxes in the trunk and asked Pham’s permission to open
them.38 The State claims that Pham indicated that the boxes were not his
and allowed Agent Smith to search them.39 The boxes contained 19 pounds
of marijuana, leading to Pham’s arrest.40 At trial, Pham was found guilty of
felony possession with intent to distribute and sentenced to 15 years in the
Montana State Prison.41
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court unanimously decided that
Agent Smith seized Pham when Agent Smith continued his conversation
and asked to search Pham’s vehicle after confirming that Pham was not lost
and not committing an immediately apparent offense.42 To determine
whether Pham was seized, the Court used the factors adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall43 by evaluating the
totality of the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, the officer’s physical touching of the person, or the
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officers
request is compelled.44 Here, two of the officers were armed and in uniform, and although Agent Smith was in plain clothes, he wore his DCI
badge indicating he was an officer.45 Agent Smith and Trooper Kilpela employed a “continuous barrage of questions,” which indicated that Pham’s
compliance was compelled.46 The Court held, therefore, that a reasonable
person in Pham’s position would not have felt “free to leave,” and thus,
Pham was seized.47
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223.
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
Pham, 497 P.3d at 222 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
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In determining that Pham was seized, the Court distinguished Pham
from four prominent Montana search and seizure cases—State v. Wilkins,48
State v. Ballinger,49 State v. Dupree,50 and State v. Questo51—on the basis
that, in those cases, law enforcement possessed some valid initial reason to
approach the individual.52 Whereas here, Pham’s responses to Agent
Smith’s questions ruled out that he was lost or in need of help, and Agent
Smith testified that he “didn’t know what the offense [he was] looking at
was.”53 Thus, Agent Smith and the two MHP officers did not have a valid
reason to keep engaging with Pham.54
After a determination that Pham was seized, the Court held that Agent
Smith did not have particularized suspicion to seize Pham.55 Particularized
suspicion for an investigative stop requires that the officer have objective
data and articulable facts from which the officer can make certain reasonable inferences and a resulting suspicion that the person to be stopped has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.56
On its face, Pham’s holding might not appear to be significant to Montana practitioners. There is no dissent.57 Pham does not alter the test for
seizure of a person or particularized suspicion in Montana.58 Pham plainly
holds that an individual staring at a police van full of marijuana does not
give an officer particularized suspicion to seize an individual.59
Pham is significant because the Montana Supreme Court has been a
tool for racism, and particularly racism against Asian Montanans, during an
earlier part of its history.60 In 1883, the Montana Supreme Court upheld
convictions for non-Chinese defendants 50% of the time, while upholding
convictions for Chinese defendants at nearly the same rate of 52%.61 But
from 1883 to 1902, the Court upheld convictions for non-Chinese defendants 63% of the time; while the Court upheld convictions for Chinese defendants at a rate of 75%.62

OF

48. 205 P.3d 795 (Mont. 2009).
49. 366 P.3d 668 (Mont. 2016).
50. 346 P.3d 1114 (Mont. 2015).
51. 433 P.3d 403 (Mont. 2019).
52. Pham, 497 P.3d at 223.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id. at 223.
56. Id. at 224 (citing State v. Strom, 333 P.3d 218, 282 (Mont. 2014)).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 222–23.
59. See id. at 223–24.
60. See, e.g., John R. Wunder, Law and Chinese in Frontier Montana, MONTANA: THE MAGAZINE
W. HISTORY, 1980, at 29.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Here, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the ghost of its past self by
denying the State a successful prosecution based on racial profiling. The
Court stops just short of explicitly calling out the racism inherent in the
State’s arrest and subsequent prosecution of Pham in summing up the case
with, “Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, we are left with the fact
that Agent Smith saw a Vietnamese person, traveling along a route where
other Vietnamese individuals had been arrested for drug trafficking, and
became suspicious that Pham was trafficking drugs.”63
Pham also poses a significant counterfactual. What if Agent Smith had
given some other reason to seize Pham? Montana law bars police officers
from racial profiling individuals suspected of crime.64 However, this statutory prohibition provides significant leeway and deference to officers: “The
race or ethnicity of an individual may not be the sole factor in constituting a
particularized suspicion that an offense has been or is being committed in
order to justify the detention of an individual or the investigatory stop of a
motor vehicle.”65 This statute is consistent with the standard given by the
United States Supreme Court—that race may be a factor in determining
probable cause, so long as it is not the only factor.66 Thus, it is possible that
if Agent Smith had also said that from his many years of police experience
he knew that suspicious individuals tend to show a heightened concern for
police activity in the form of staring, the State’s crime of racial profiling
could be forgiven by the Court.
Pham’s outcome is a significant step in the Montana Supreme Court’s
treatment of its citizens of color, particularly Asian Montanans. In the final
paragraph of the opinion, Justice Laurie McKinnon, writing for the majority, quotes United States Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor’s dissent
in Utah v. Strieff, “When we condone officers’ use of [these devices] without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary
manner. We also risk treating them as second-class citizens.”67 Although
once nearly 10% of Montana’s population,68 in 2020 Asian Montanans accounted for just 1% of Montana’s population.69 This diaspora was influenced by the discriminatory treatment that Asian Montanans received by
63. Pham, 497 P.3d at 224.
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-2-117(1) (2021).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 252 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975)) (emphasis added). It is unclear whether this signals that
Montana will adopt the presence of a valid warrant exception to the exclusionary rule that the United
States Supreme Court adopted in Strieff.
67. Pham, 497 P.3d at 224 (citing Strieff, 579 U.S. at 252 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
68. Wunder, supra note 60, at 21–22.
69. America Counts Staff, Montana Population Topped the One Million Mark in 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/QZN7-VDWF.
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the Montana Supreme Court in both criminal and civil matters.70 While
racism against Asian Montanans still very much haunts this state,71 the
Montana Supreme Court’s holding in Pham correctly denies the State a
prosecution built on evidence from a police investigation entirely motivated
by race.
—Victoria Hill
III. CLARK FORK COALITION V. MONTANA DEPARTMENT
RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION72

OF

NATURAL

In Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation, the Montana Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, upheld
the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC)
decision to grant RC Resources, Inc. (RCR) a water use permit for the proposed Phase 2 of the Rock Creek Mine Project (RCMP) in Montana’s Cabinet Mountains Range near Noxon, Montana.73 The Montana Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the district court striking down the permit, and the
Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the “legal demands” of the
Montana Water Use Act (MWUA) required DNRC to consider whether the
proposed use also complies with Montana Water Quality Act (MWQA)
classification and applicable MWQA nondegradation standards, independently applicable to the source and affected waters under the MWQA.74
The Court also rejected Clark Fork Coalition’s argument that the MWUA
violated their right to a clean and healthful environment under the Montana
Constitution by denying them the opportunity for advance MWQA compliance review by DNRC as part of the MWUA beneficial water use permitting process.75
The RCMP is a proposed two-phase underground silver and copper
mining operation of RCR spread across various sites in and about the
Kaniksu National Forest in Sanders County, Montana.76 Phase 1 will disturb a total of about 20 acres on public and private land and involve excavation of approximately 178,000 tons of waste rock and ore from the evaluation adit (i.e., a tunnel or shaft).77 The purpose of Phase 1 is to obtain the
metallurgical, geotechnical, and hydrological data necessary for further as70.
71.
COVID
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Wunder, supra note 60, at 22–23.
See Jordan Unger, Increased reports of discrimination directed at Asians in Missoula as
spreads, MISSOULA CURRENT (Oct. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/7W32-25NT.
481 P.3d 198 (Mont. 2021).
Id. at 201, 224.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
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sessment of the technical, economic, and legal feasibility of commercial
mining operations under the proposed Phase 2.78 The Phase 2 permit authorizes the RCR to annually appropriate up to 857 acre-feet of groundwater
that will flow into the underground adits.79
The Clark Fork Coalition and other environmental groups (“Objectors”) originally filed a Montana state court action in 2002 alleging that
MDEQ illegally issued the 2001 Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (MPDES) permit without conducting a full MWQA nondegradation
review of the proposed discharge into the Clark Fork River.80 In 2018, Objectors petitioned for judicial review of the DNRC agency decision that
granted RCR the permit on the grounds that the DNRC erroneously concluded that their MWQA objections were not pertinent as a matter of law to
whether the proposed volume of water is legally available as referenced in
§ 311(1)(a)(ii) of the MWUA.81 Alternatively, Objectors asserted that even
if the DNRC correctly interpreted that section of the MWUA, the MWUA
would violate Article II, Section 3,82 and Article IX, Section 1,83 of the
Montana Constitution by denying them adequate remedy to enforce
MWQA nondegradation standards in this case.84
In an opinion written by Justice Dirk Sandefur, the Court noted that the
MDEQ is responsible for administering the MMRA, MWQA, and the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), which govern all water quality
issues regarding mining operations under Montana law.85 In contrast, the
DNRC is responsible for administering the MWUA, which governs who,
how much, and for what purposes individuals and entities may use water in
Montana.86
In approving a permit to appropriate water, the DNRC must evaluate
whether the applicant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the permit meets the criteria under § 311 of the MWUA.87 More specifically, DNRC will issue a permit if the applicant proves that there is water
physically available and that water can be considered legally available dur78. Id.
79. Id. at 199.
80. Id. at 206.
81. Id. at 212.
82. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . .”).
83. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(3) (“The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the
protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”).
84. Clark Fork Coal., 481 P.3d at 212.
85. Id. at 204–05.
86. Id. at 205.
87. Id. at 214.
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ing the period which the applicant seeks to appropriate.88 “Legal availability” is determined by physical water availability; identification of existing
legal demands on the source of supply throughout the area of potential impact by the proposed use; and an analysis of the evidence of physical water
availability and the existing legal demands.89
The Court found this MWUA provision to be clear and unambiguous,
in that nothing in the MWUA manifests an intent to incorporate compliance
with MWQA classification-based nondegradation standards—independently applicable to the subject water use under the MWQA—with the required or permissible MWUA considerations regarding “existing legal demands of the source supply” of water.90
On legislative intent, the Court found that the primary purpose of the
MWUA was to provide for the beneficial use of Montana waters through a
centralized administration.91 Additionally, the Court noted that the
MWUA’s secondary purpose was to provide for the wise utilization, development, and conservation of state waters for the maximum benefits to
Montanans, with the least possible degradation of the natural aquatic ecosystems.92 However, the Court rejected Objectors’ argument that this secondary purpose is served by limiting the scope of water quality nondegradation objections under the MWUA because the Montana Legislature separately charged the MDEQ with the duty and expertise to administer the
standards at issue here.93
Justice Laurie McKinnon, joined by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, dissented on the issue of the MWUA’s “legal demands,” which they argue is
dispositive in this case.94 First, the dissent states that the majority’s analysis
should have remained confined to the MWUA.95 Next, the dissent argues
that the majority incorrectly interpreted that the legislative intent of the
MWUA and MWQA was that the DNRC and MDEQ were to have mutually exclusive responsibilities in their roles protecting Montanans’ constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment.96 The dissent cites that the
framers of the Montana Constitution wanted “the strongest environmental
protection provision found in any state constitution.”97
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1)(a)(i)–(ii) (2021).
89. Id. § 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii)(A)–(C).
90. Clark Fork Coal., 481 P.3d at 215.
91. Id. at 215–16.
92. Id. at 219.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 224 (McKinnon, J., with Gustafson, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246
(Mont. 1999)).
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The dissent argues that the Outstanding Resource Waters (ORWs)
within the federally designated Cabinet Mountain Wilderness Area are statutorily protected against dewatering under both federal and state law.98
Under Montana law, ORWs are of such environmental, ecological, or economic value that the state should prohibit changes to the existing quality of
those waters to the greatest extent practicable.99 The parties did not dispute
that the issuance of the DNRC’s water permit for the Rock Creek Mine
project would deplete one or more specifically identified and protected
ORWs.100 The Montana Legislature has mandated that both the DNRC and
the MDEQ have the responsibility to enforce these protections.101 Based on
the plain language of the MWUA, which authorizes the DNRC to issue
water permits, the DNRC was required to consider the impact of dewatering
on these protected ORWs before it issued a water permit which would deplete a federally and state protected stream.102 Since the DNRC did not
consider the impact on ORWs, despite having evidence that these protected
waters would be depleted, the dissenting Justices would affirm the district
court’s decision that the impact on ORWs must be considered by the DNRC
before issuance of a water permit.103
Clark Fork Coalition is significant because its holding compartmentalizes environmental harms into agency camps, limiting the potential success
for future environmental causes of action in Montana. Furthermore, it adds
to the small number of Article II, Section 3 cases litigated at the Montana
Supreme Court—of which the Court has most often rejected the constitutional claims of environmentally-concerned groups asserting their right to a
clean and healthful environment.104 This lack of legal teeth in this constitutional provision is significant because, as the dissent correctly identifies, the
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention wanted “the
strongest environmental protection provision found in any state constitution.”105
—Victoria Hill

98. Id. at 224–25.
99. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 75-5-315 (2021).
100. Clark Fork Coal., 481 P.3d at 225 (McKinnon, J., with Gustafson, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 226.
103. Id.
104. Westlaw Edge search for Montana cases using the phrase “clean and healthful environment” in
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 only revealed 35 total cases (accessed Apr. 3, 2022).
105. Clark Fork Coal., 481 P.3d at 224 (McKinnon, J., with Gustafson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999)).
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STATE V. Q. SMITH106

In State v. Q. Smith, the Montana Supreme Court held that Quincy
Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway which was
violated after a sheriff’s deputy—who had pulled Smith over—refused
Smith’s request to leave and come back with a warrant.107
On May 15, 2019, Smith and his friend Jacques Hennequin were driving on Hidden Valley Road in Ravalli County towards Hennequin’s house,
where Smith also resided. Ravalli County Sheriff’s Deputy Nicholas Monaco was driving on Hidden Valley Road in the opposite direction when he
observed Smith’s vehicle traveling approximately 17 miles per hour over
the speed limit. Monaco turned around, activated his lights, and pursued
Smith’s vehicle. Although Monaco had activated his lights, his dash camera
footage showed that Smith’s vehicle was only visible for roughly one second before it rounded an “S” shaped curve in the road. Approximately 21
seconds after Monaco activated his lights, Smith pulled into a 350-foot residential driveway and parked next to a garage.108
Hennequin’s house is located on a five-acre property which has both a
perimeter fence encompassing the property and an interior fence surrounding the house and yard.109 Although both fences have gates, both gates were
open on the night of the stop.110 Additionally, although the residence is
partially shielded from the road and neighboring properties by numerous
trees and foliage, the property did not have any “No Trespassing” signs
posted.111
Shortly after Smith parked his vehicle, Monaco approached Smith and
Hennequin and informed them that he had pulled Smith over for speeding.112 Both Smith and Hennequin immediately informed Monaco that he
was on private property and would need to return with a warrant.113 Rather
than leaving the property, Monaco radioed for backup and requested
Smith’s license and registration.114 The stop then ripened into an investigation for driving under the influence (“DUI”) after Monaco detected an odor
of alcohol on Smith.115 During the course of the DUI investigation, Sergeant Guisinger arrived to assist Monaco.116 The confrontation between
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

501 P.3d 398 (Mont. 2021).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
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Smith, Hennequin, and the officers ultimately resulted in Guisinger tasing
and arresting Smith.117
Smith was later charged with speeding, obstructing a peace officer,
DUI, and resisting arrest—all misdemeanors. Smith moved the justice court
to suppress all evidence obtained during the altercation, arguing that Monaco’s initial entry onto his driveway and refusal to leave violated his constitutional rights. The justice court denied the motion and found Smith guilty
of all charges following a bench trial. On appeal to the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, the district court again denied Smith’s motion to suppress, concluding that Smith did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway. Smith pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI but reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. Smith then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.118
The Montana Supreme Court reviews lower court findings of fact in
denials of suppression motions for clear error and reviews the district
court’s interpretation and application of the governing law.119
Smith argued on appeal that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his driveway because the driveway was within the curtilage of the home
and that no exigent circumstances existed to allow Monaco to conduct a
warrantless investigation on the property.120 The State countered that Smith
did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable and that Smith’s failure to stop after Monaco initiated contact constituted a hot pursuit, creating an exigent circumstance justifying Monaco’s
warrantless entry.121
The Court began its analysis by examining the protections from unreasonable searches and seizures afforded under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and under Article II, Section 11 of the Montana
Constitution.122 Additionally, the Court noted that under Article II, Section
10, an individual’s right to privacy “shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest,” evidencing that the Montana Constitution provides greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment.123
Because the Montana Constitution provides this greater privacy protection, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether Smith’s drive117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 401.
121. Id. at 403, 405.
122. Id. at 402. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
. . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .”).
123. Q. Smith, 501 P.3d at 403 (quoting MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10).
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way was within the curtilage of his dwelling under the Fourth Amendment
framework.124 Instead the Court looked to its decision in State v. Bullock125
to determine whether Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
driveway and, therefore, whether Monaco’s search had been unlawful.126 In
Bullock, the Court rejected the distinction between curtilage and open fields
drawn under the Fourth Amendment and instead adopted a three-part test to
determine whether an unlawful government search has occurred.127 Under
this three-part test, the Court considers “(1) whether [an individual has] an
actual expectation of privacy . . . ; (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable; and (3) the nature of the
[S]tate’s intrusion.”128
Smith argued that he satisfied the first factor under Bullock because the
length of the driveway, the perimeter and interior fencing surrounding the
property, and the secluded nature of the property indicated that he had an
actual expectation of privacy.129 The Court rejected this argument, finding
that—unlike in Bullock, where the landowner had moved his cabin farther
from the road, erected fencing, and posted “No Trespassing” signs—neither
Smith nor Hennequin had taken measures to communicate that entry was
not permitted.130 Specifically, although the property was surrounded by two
fences, both gates were open and no signs were posted which would have
given Monaco warning that he should not enter the property.131
Although the Court found that Monaco was justified in his initial entry
of the property, the dynamic changed once Smith and Hennequin informed
him that entry onto their property was not permitted.132 The Court reasoned
that the second factor under Bullock indicates that regardless of whether
there are gates or signs posted, society recognizes an actual expectation of
privacy as reasonable once a resident communicates that entry is not permitted.133 Here, the Court found that once Smith informed Monaco he was
trespassing and needed a warrant, the communication was unmistakable.134
Finally, the Court considered the third factor of whether the State’s
intrusion had infringed upon Smith’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Here, the State argued that Monaco’s intrusion onto the property was mini124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995).
Q. Smith, 501 P.3d at 403.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 97 P.3d 567, 570 (Mont. 2004)).
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405.
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mal under the circumstances. The Court found this argument persuasive,
noting (1) that Monaco had initiated the stop prior to Smith entering his
property, and (2) that Monaco’s subsequent pursuit of Smith onto the property and preliminary questioning regarding who lived on the property and
whether Smith was the driver were minimally intrusive. However, the Court
reasoned that after Smith informed Monaco that he lived on the property
and explicitly invoked his right to privacy, Monaco’s refusal to leave and
the subsequent DUI investigation constituted a search requiring a warrant or
an exception to the warrant requirement.135
Having determined that Monaco’s additional questioning and DUI investigation constituted a search, the Court next considered whether exigent
circumstances existed which justified a warrantless search.136 The Court
noted that an exigent circumstance is one “that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to
the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.”137
Here, the State first argued that Smith’s failure to pull over after Monaco initiated a stop constituted a hot pursuit justifying entry onto the property.138 The Court found this argument unpersuasive, citing its prior decision in State v. Sorenson139 in which the Court held that a “hot pursuit
justified a warrantless entry only if a felony has been committed and the
suspect is fleeing.”140 As Monaco only pursued Smith onto his property for
a misdemeanor speeding violation, the circumstances did not amount to a
hot pursuit justifying exigent circumstances.141
The State next argued that, had Monaco been forced to obtain a warrant, Smith would have been able to avoid the DUI charge because he could
have later claimed that he only consumed alcohol after returning home.142
The Court again found this argument unpersuasive, noting that at no point
prior to entering Smith’s driveway did Monaco suspect Smith of driving
under the influence.143 Specifically, Smith was not driving erratically and
Monaco did not smell alcohol on Smith until more than seven minutes after
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
ted).
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Wakeford, 953 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Mont. 1998)).
Id.
590 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1979).
Q. Smith, 501 P.3d at 406 (quoting Sorenson, 590 P.2d at 139) (internal quotation marks omitId.
Id.
Id.
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his investigation began.144 Therefore, the Court held that Smith’s failure to
stop for a minor traffic violation did not create an exigent circumstance
allowing Monaco to conduct a warrantless search after Smith invoked his
right to privacy by demanding that Monaco obtain a warrant.145 On these
grounds, the Court reversed and remanded the case to district court with
instructions “to enter an order suppressing all evidence obtained by the officers after they were told to leave Smith’s residence.”146
Q. Smith is a significant case for Montana practitioners working in
criminal law. This decision reinforces the broader protections to privacy
guaranteed by the Montana Constitution and clarifies that even when a
property is not secluded, fenced off, or marked with “No Trespassing”
signs, once the owner invokes their right to privacy, the State risks suppression of the evidence unless it retreats off the property and obtains a warrant
before continuing an investigation for misdemeanor offenses.
—Eric Monroe
V.

MONTANA INDEPENDENT LIVING PROJECT, INC. V. CITY
HELENA147

OF

In Montana Independent Living Project, Inc. v. City of Helena, the
Montana Supreme Court held that the Montana Independent Living Project,
Inc. (MILP) was barred from bringing a retaliation claim under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) because the plain language of the statute
allows only an “individual”—not a non-human entity—to file retaliation
claims.148
MILP is a state- and federally-funded non-profit and independent living center that advocates for individuals with disabilities in Montana.149 In
2014, MILP requested funds from the City of Helena (“City”) to purchase a
van that could be used when city services were unavailable to transport
individuals with disabilities.150 This request was initially ranked as a top
priority for City funding by the Helena Area Transportation Advisory Committee (HATAC), an informal committee of stakeholders that offers nonbinding recommendations to the City regarding transportation services.151
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
479 P.3d 961 (Mont. 2021).
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id.
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On February 17, 2015, MILP filed a complaint with the Montana
Human Rights Bureau (HRB) claiming that the City’s public transit system
had discriminated against people with disabilities by segregating them from
others after the City adopted a new series of bus routes.152 Following
MILP’s complaint, the City Commission elected to depart from its typical
practice of following the HATAC’s recommendations, downgraded the priority of MILP’s van request, and placed another project ahead of it.153
However, despite the City Commission lowering the priority of MILP’s request, the Montana Department of Transportation nonetheless funded
MILP’s request.154
After the City downgraded MILP’s request, MILP withdrew its initial
complaint with the HRB and filed a new complaint alleging that the City
had violated the MHRA when it retaliated against MILP by lowering the
priority of their request as a direct result of MILP filing a complaint with
the HRB.155
As part of its investigation, MILP discovered and produced e-mails
and other communications which it alleged showed animus and discriminatory behavior toward MILP and its Chief Executive Officer, Robert Maffit.156 However, despite MILP’s production of the e-mails and communications, the HRB found there was “no reasonable cause to believe the City
had retaliated against either MILP or Maffit.”157 Additionally, the HRB
concluded that because MILP was a corporation and not an individual,
MILP did not have standing to file a retaliation complaint under the
MHRA.158 The relevant section of the MHRA states that it is an unlawful
discriminatory practice for a governmental entity or agency to “discharge,
expel, blacklist, or otherwise discriminate against an individual because the
individual has . . . filed a complaint . . . under this chapter.”159 The term
“individual” is not defined in the MHRA, and the HRB interpreted this
provision to mean that non-human entities do not qualify as individuals and
are therefore barred from filing retaliation complaints under this section.160
Following the HRB’s decision, MILP and Maffit brought an action in
district court seeking a judicial determination that the HRB’s decision was
“unlawful, incorrect, and an abuse of discretion.”161 The City moved to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (2021)).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (emphasis added).
Mont. Indep. Living Project, Inc., 479 P.3d at 963–64.
Id. at 963.
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dismiss MILP’s retaliation action for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted on November 18, 2019.162 In granting the City’s motion
to dismiss, the district court agreed with the HRB that the MHRA “does not
allow non-human entities to sue for retaliation,” and therefore, that MILP
had no standing.163 MILP appealed this decision to the Montana Supreme
Court and asked the Court to determine whether the language of the MHRA
under § 49-2-301 prevented non-human entities from filing complaints for
retaliation.164
The Montana Supreme Court reviews de novo a district court’s ruling
on a motion to dismiss.165 Furthermore, interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the Court also reviews de novo.166
MILP first argued that the district court erred in failing to conform its
interpretation of the statutory language to the MHRA’s “broad purpose and
legislative history,” and because its conclusion did not comport with “federal authority that supports a broad implied right of action for retaliation.”167 While the Montana Supreme Court agreed that the MHRA’s protection from discrimination is broad, the Court also noted that, although
“person” is defined in the statute, the MHRA does not define “individual.”168 Therefore, the Court turned to the plain language of the statute to
determine whether the language was “clear and unambiguous”—in which
case, no further interpretation would be required.169
Here, the Court found that the language of § 49-2-301 “clearly and
unambiguously prohibits a ‘person’ from retaliating against an ‘individual,’” and because the statute uses both “person” and “individual,” the statute clearly draws a distinction between the two.170 Specifically, the Court
noted that “[w]hen the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature intends the terms to have different meanings.”171 The Court reasoned that because “person” is defined under the
MHRA to include both “individuals” and non-human entities, the inclusion
of “individual” in § 49-2-301 would be unnecessary and redundant unless
the legislature specifically intended to distinguish the two.172 Thus, the
Court concluded that the legislature’s inclusion of “individual” in the lan162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Hein v. Scott, 353 P.3d 494, 497 (Mont. 2015)).
(quoting Bates v. Neva, 339 P.3d 1265, 1267 (Mont. 2014)).
at 964.
(citing Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. State, 201 P.3d 132, 135 (Mont. 2009)).
(citing Densley v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 173 P.3d 885, 889 (Wash. 2007)).
at 964–65.
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guage of the statute was clearly and unambiguously intended to exclude
non-human entities.173
MILP next argued that the use of the word “individual” was irrelevant
because, in a different section of the MHRA, § 49-2-501(1) allows a “person” harmed by a discriminatory practice to file a complaint under the
MHRA.174 However, the Court found that MILP had misread the language
of the statute and that, in fact, a “person” is permitted to file a complaint
“only if the person suffers a ‘Prohibited Discriminatory Practice’ as defined
by Part 3 of the MHRA.”175 The Court found MILP’s argument unpersuasive when noting that the “prohibited practices” described in § 49-2-301
proscribe retaliation against “an individual” and, therefore, “the law makes
retaliation a prohibited practice only when the retaliation is directed at an
individual.”176
Finally, MILP argued that if the MHRA did not support an implied
right of action for non-human entities to file retaliation claims, federal authority did.177 However, the Court found that, because the statute clearly
and unambiguously bars claims by non-human entities, the Court did not
need to address MILP’s argument regarding other federal authority interpreting the meaning of an “individual.”178 Thus, the Court held that the
district court was correct in finding that § 49-2-301 does not permit nonhuman entities to file retaliation claims under the MHRA and that the plain
language of the statute allows only a “natural human person”—an “individual”—to seek a remedy for retaliation.179
Montana Independent Living Project, Inc. is a significant case for
Montana practitioners working in civil law. The Montana Supreme Court’s
decision makes clear that the MHRA does not permit non-human entities to
bring claims seeking redress for retaliation. Unless the statute’s language is
amended to remove “individual” or else add a definition of “individual” that
includes non-human entities, such entities will be unable to bring a claim of
retaliation under the MHRA.
—Eric Monroe

173. Id. at 965.
174. Id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501(1) (2021) (“A person claiming to be aggrieved by
any discriminatory practice prohibited by this chapter may file a complaint with the department.”).
175. Mont. Indep. Living Project, Inc., 479 P.3d at 965 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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CHILDRESS V. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP.180

In an original proceeding, the Montana Supreme Court answered a legal question of first impression certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Whether, under Montana law, parasitic emotional distress damages are available for an underlying negligence claim for
personal property damage.181 The Court, in a unanimous opinion penned by
Senior Associate Justice Jim Rice, answered in the negative and declined to
extend claims for parasitic emotional distress damages to cases where the
underlying claim is damage to or loss of personal property as a result of
negligent conduct.182
As a general matter, parasitic emotional distress damages are a category of damages, not a separate claim—sometimes considered a damage
award’s “peripheral element.”183 Parasitic emotional distress damages may
also be termed “loss of enjoyment of life,” “emotional damages,” or “hedonic damages.”184 These damages occur, and may be claimed, as a result
of some negligently inflicted physical injury.185 But what exactly constitutes parasitic emotional distress damages varies across jurisdictions—the
common denominator being that these damages must have a “host” claim
within which to attach.186 What constitutes a proper “host” claim also varies
across jurisdictions; there are limits on what causes of action may serve as
actionable “host” claims.187 Ultimately, awarding parasitic damages continues to be debated, and the legal landscape is fraught over how to handle
awards of the same.188 One scholar notes that the increasing prevalence of
such awards may be due to the shift in tort law “from formalistic limitations
on liability toward making the plaintiff whole. This focus on wholeness
inevitably has come to encompass parasitic emotional harms.”189
180. 493 P.3d 314 (Mont. 2021).
181. Id. at 314.
182. Id. at 318.
183. John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV.
789, 831 (2007).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at App. D.
187. See id.
188. Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2610 (2015) (explaining the “brief but complicated history of emotional harm claims,” distinguishing between awards
for “parasitic harm to personal injury or property damage claims” and stand-alone claims for emotional
distress, and discussing that the common law “traditionally recognized emotional harm claims as a
component of trespassory torts . . . allowing the presumption of damages without a showing of related
physical injury”).
189. Kircher, supra note 183, at 837.
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A. Background
On September 23, 2016, Randall and Claudia Childress (“Childresses”) took their car to Costco Wholesale Tire Center (“Costco”) in Missoula to get its tires rotated before heading back home to Pritchard,
Idaho.190 The Childresses went to pick up their car following the service,
only to discover that a Costco employee had mistakenly given its keys to a
man pretending to be the Childresses’ son, who then drove the car away.191
Located at a truck stop a short time later, the vehicle was abandoned and
several items were missing, including a handgun, ammunition, a house key,
and documents containing the Childresses’ home address.192
Following the occurrence, Costco prepared an incident report wherein
it indicated that its employee caused the damage.193 Costco also paid for a
rental car, paid for the Childresses’ car to be detailed, and asked the Childresses to keep track of other expenses with the intent of later reimbursing
them.194 The Childresses, out of fear of returning home, spent roughly five
days traveling between Idaho and Eastern Washington.195 When they did
return home, the Childresses submitted a demand to Costco for an additional $4,195.48, which purported to cover costs associated with the rekeying of their car, trailer, and home, as well as replacing items stolen from the
vehicle and travel expenses from the preceding five days.196 The parties
negotiated this figure down to a payment of $3,480 in exchange for a signed
release; the Childresses took the signed release to an attorney for review,
thereafter seeking—albeit unsuccessfully—an increased demand.197
B. Procedural Posture
The Childresses subsequently filed suit against Costco in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana, Missoula Division, alleging negligence, bailment, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED),
and negligent training and supervision.198 The Childresses ultimately proceeded to trial on the negligence and bailment claims.199 At trial, the Childresses presented evidence that Randall Childress—who had previously
190. Order and Opinion at 2, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV-18-183-M-DWM (D.
Mont. Apr. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/V9CY-BGPR.
191. Id.
192. Order at 1, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV-18-183-M-DWM (D. Mont. Dec. 21,
2021), https://perma.cc/GJX8-T3SL.
193. Order and Opinion, supra note 190, at 2.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2–3.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Order, supra note 192, at 1–2.
199. Id. at 2.
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suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following his military service in Vietnam—had experienced exacerbated symptoms as a result of the
event.200 Additionally, the Childresses presented evidence that Claudia
Childress subsequently suffered from stress, sleeplessness, fear, and nightmares.201
Following closing arguments, but before the court issued jury instructions, Costco moved to exclude any claim for emotional distress damages
on grounds that Montana law did not allow claims of negligent damage to
personal property to serve as a host claim for parasitic emotional distress
damages.202 Over Costco’s objection, the district court instructed the jury
that if it found for the Childresses on the negligence claim, then it also
“must determine the amount of damages” for any injury caused as a result
of Costco’s negligence.203 In doing so, the federal district court gave the
jury an instruction outlining “Emotional Distress – Generally.”204 Under the
parameters of this instruction, emotional distress includes “the mental,
physical, and emotional pain and suffering experienced and that with reasonable probability will be experienced in the future.”205 The jury verdict
held Costco liable on both bailment and negligence, and awarded “nonproperty” damages as to the latter.206
Thereafter, Costco appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, with the central issue being whether the standard outlined
in the district court’s jury instruction was properly applied in determining
the parasitic emotional distress damage award when the original “host”
cause of action—Randall’s independent NIED claim—had been withdrawn.207 Costco argued the district court violated Montana law by allowing the jury to assign a “non-property” damages award—which effectively awarded parasitic emotional distress damages.208 Costco argued this
violated Montana law because the award was based solely on negligent
damage to personal property and no precedent existed in Montana for negligent property damage to act as a host for an award of parasitic damages.209
The Childresses argued the district court did not err in instructing the jury,
200. Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 978 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2020).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 666–67 (noting that the jury instruction issued by the district court was modified from
MONT. PATTERN JURY INSTR. 25.02, “Personal Injury (Emotional Distress - Generally)”).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 667 (noting that the jury awarded $2,278.43 in property damages on the bailment claim
and $62,750 in unspecified, non-property damages on the negligence claim).
207. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 10, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 978 F.3d
664 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-35441, 19-35493) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief].
208. Id. at 1.
209. Id.
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and that the proper requisite standard for an award of parasitic emotional
distress damages is a showing that the negligent conduct caused some property or monetary damage.210
The Ninth Circuit answered Costco’s appeal by certifying a question
of law—in “the spirit of comity and federalism,” and pursuant to Rule 15 of
the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure—to the Montana Supreme
Court.211 The court of appeals stated “whether parasitic emotional distress
damages are available for an underlying negligence claim for personal property damage or loss presents important policy ramifications for Montana
that have not yet been resolved by the Montana Supreme Court.”212 The
Montana Supreme Court accepted the certified question and approved a
scheduling order roughly three months later.213
C. Original Proceeding at the Montana Supreme Court
Costco presented several arguments in its briefing to the Montana Supreme Court. First, Costco argued that parasitic emotional distress damages
may not be recovered when the underlying “host” claim is negligent damage to personal property.214 Costco noted the Montana Supreme Court has
specifically held that emotional distress damages, as a matter of law, are not
appropriate in all cases,215 and further cited the Restatement (Third) of
Torts for the long-standing rule that “[r]ecovery for emotional harm resulting from negligently caused harm to personal property is not permitted.”216
Second, Costco argued that Montana law requires a heightened standard of proof for independent NIED claims.217 In Sacco v. High Country
Independent Press, Inc.,218 the Montana Supreme Court held that NIED can
sometimes stand as an independent cause of action, but only in “circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the
210. Appellee Childresses’ Answering Brief at 19, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 978 F.3d
664 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-35441, 19-35493).
211. Childress, 978 F.3d at 665.
212. Id.; see also Katrina Thorness, Preview, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp.: Parasitic Emotional Distress – Will Montana Courts Soon Be Flooded by Litigation over Hurt Feelings?, 81 MONT. L.
REV. ONLINE 24, 30 (2020), https://perma.cc/8KP6-6EV4 (previewing the parties’ oral argument before
the Ninth Circuit, noting “it is less likely that the Ninth Circuit will certify the question to the Montana
Supreme Court, because the question present[ed] is based on case law, not a bill enacted by the Montana
Legislature,” and predicting that the court of appeals would dispose of the case procedurally by reversing the district court and granting Costco’s request for a new trial).
213. Order at 1, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 493 P.3d 314 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 20-0526).
214. Costco’s Opening Brief on Certified Question at 11, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 493
P.3d 314 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 20-0526), https://perma.cc/889H-YGYF [hereinafter Opening Brief].
215. Id. at 9 (citing Maloney v. Home Investment Center, Inc., 994 P.2d 1124 (Mont. 2000)).
216. Id. at 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 2013)).
217. Id. at 13.
218. 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995).
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reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or
omission.”219 Costco argued that to allow Claudia’s recovery for parasitic
damages would effectively include emotional distress as an element of a
compensatory damage award, and void Sacco’s “serious or severe” standard.220 Costco posited that such nullification of long-standing precedent
would open the floodgates on emotional distress claims.221 Finally, Costco
argued that just because claims for parasitic emotional distress damages
have been allowed in certain types of cases, namely—bad faith insurance,222 civil rights or discrimination,223 and loss of use and enjoyment of
real property224—this did not mean that emotional distress damages were
available for “any and all torts” under Montana law.225
In reply, the Childresses argued that the controlling principle under
Montana law was that the severity of the harm governs the amount—not the
availability—of recovery for parasitic emotional distress damages.226 The
Childresses argued that Jacobsen v. Allstate227 created a bright-line rule
affirming the proposition that recovering damages in cases of parasitic emotional distress does not require the heightened showing outlined in Sacco.228
In Jacobsen and its progeny, the Montana Supreme Court declined to apply
Sacco’s heightened standard of proof and held that “the ‘serious or severe’
standard announced in Sacco applies only to independent claims of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.”229 The Jacobsen court
went on to adopt the standard in Montana Pattern Jury Instruction 25.02—
the same instruction the United States District Court approved at trial when
it instructed the jury on emotional distress—that there is no “definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental and emotional suffering and distress.”230 Simply put, the Childresses maintained that Jacobsen
219. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added).
220. Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 13.
221. Id. at 23; see also Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425–26 (“Concern over a floodgate of claims for emotional distress, particularly fraudulent claims, is alleviated by the necessity to prove that the emotional
distress suffered is severe or serious. . . . Concern over seemingly unlimited liability for defendants is
alleviated by the necessity of demonstrating that plaintiff’s serious or severe emotional distress was the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant’s negligent act or omission.”).
222. Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 14–15 (citing Jacobsen v. Allstate, 215 P.3d 649 (Mont.
2009) (recognizing claims for emotional distress parasitic damages under the Unfair Trade Practices
Act)).
223. Id. at 14 (citing Vortex Fishing Systems v. Foss, 38 P.3d 836 (Mont. 2001)).
224. Id. (citing Maloney v. Home Investment Center, Inc., 994 P.2d 1124, 1137 (Mont. 2000)).
225. Id.
226. Childresses’ Principal Brief at 9, Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 493 P.3d 314 (Mont.
2021) (No. OP 20-0526), https://perma.cc/LX7N-7WZS [hereinafter Principal Brief].
227. 215 P.3d 649 (Mont. 2009).
228. Principal Brief, supra note 226, at 9.
229. Id. at 13 (citing Jacobsen, 215 P.3d at 664).
230. MONT. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. 25.02 (2d ed. 2003).
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remains good law and should be extended to allow parasitic emotional damage awards where that emotional distress is hosted by a claim of negligent
damage to personal property.231
The arguments before the Court were conflated in that the parties were
not arguing or disagreeing on the same underlying issue. Costco maintained
that there was no basis whatsoever in Montana law for an award of parasitic
emotional distress damages to attach where negligence results in damage to
personal property.232 Costco argued that, absent a proper “host” claim, the
Childresses’ only option was to maintain an independent claim of NIED—
which would fail, since the severity of the emotional harm would not pass
muster under Sacco’s “serious or severe” requirement.233 On the other
hand, the Childresses argued that the availability for damages existed de
facto, and based this argument on two key premises.234 First, damages are
automatically available because harm occurred as a result of negligence,
and the severity of that harm controls the amount to be awarded, thus rendering Sacco inapplicable.235 Second, a separate line of Montana precedent,
spawning from Jacobsen, affirmed “the proposition that parasitic emotional
distress damages do not require a special showing of ‘serious or severe’
harm.”236
The Montana Supreme Court sided with Costco,237 taking issue with
the federal district court’s “off-the-cuff remarks,” specifically, that the distinction between real and personal property is one “that doesn’t have much
of a difference.”238 On the contrary, the Court in this case deemed the differences between real and personal property to be quite notable.239 In mak231. Principal Brief, supra note 226, at 14.
232. Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 8 (“There is no precedent in Montana, or elsewhere, allowing
a parasitic claim for emotional distress damages premised only upon damage to personal property.”).
233. Id. (“Allowing a plaintiff to maintain a parasitic emotional distress claim arising solely from
personal property damage and without a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is contrary to
Montana law and nullifies the heightened liability standard set by the Montana Supreme Court in
Sacco.”).
234. See Principal Brief, supra note 226, at 17–18.
235. Id. (citing White v. Longley, 244 P.3d 753, 762–63 (Mont. 2010)) (“Instead, ‘the severity of the
distress affects the amount of damages recovered but not the underlying entitlement to recover’.”).
236. Principal Brief, supra note 226, at 18 (citing White, 244 P.3d at 762–63) (“The Jacobsen decision consisted of a very careful effort by the Court to review the case law and clarify confusion over
‘parasitic claims’ for emotional distress. It held: Sacco’s ‘heightened standard threshold’ of ‘serious or
severe’ does not apply.”).
237. Order, supra note 192, at 5–6. See also Memorandum at 2, Childress v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., No. 19-35441 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/5SAV-C2ET (vacating the $62,750 negligent damages award and remanded the case to federal district court); Childress v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 340 F.R.D. 398, 398 (D. Mont. 2022) (Childresses ultimately recovering an award for bailment
damages—$2,278.43).
238. Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 493 P.3d 314, 317 (Mont. 2021).
239. Id. (“A review of our precedent reveals that we have differentiated between real and personal
property, extending parasitic emotional distress damages to the loss of the use and enjoyment of land;
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ing this distinction, the Court essentially accepted Costco’s argument that
“American society is more likely to consider real property to be tied to a
person’s identity,” when compared with personal property.240 The Court
“foreclosed parasitic emotional distress as an element of damages for loss to
personal property,” concluding there was no evidence that the stolen items
in this case were “so intrinsically intertwined with the Childress family dynamic that without these articles their ‘personal identity’ would be irreparably impacted.”241
D. Conclusion
Ultimately, the outcome in this case was determined by the fact that
the Childresses failed to allege a claim at trial within which parasitic emotional distress damages may be available, and that they further failed to
prove “a subjective relationship with the property on a ‘personal-identity’
level.”242 Practitioners seeking an award for parasitic emotional distress
damages should note that the Montana Supreme Court has now made clear
that where the harm is caused by the deprivation of “fungible property
whose value is derived from its utility, not for its intrinsic value,” an award
for parasitic emotional distress damages will be unavailable.243 Practitioners seeking an award of parasitic emotional distress damages should creatively paint their arguments within the Court’s lines of a “personal-identity” property concept.244
—Marti A. Liechty
VII.

MCLAUGHLIN V. MONTANA STATE LEGISLATURE245

The Montana Supreme Court formidably exercised its power of original jurisdiction when it quashed a series of subpoenas issued by the Montana State Legislature to Montana’s Judicial Branch. Two separate Montana
Supreme Court opinions resulted from the facts of this case and will be
addressed in turn.
but we have never explicitly foreclosed parasitic emotional distress as an element of damage for loss to
personal property.”).
240. Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 20.
241. Childress, 493 P.3d at 318.
242. Id. (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN L. REV. 957, 1005 (1982)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 317 (citing Radin, supra note 242, at 1002–08) (discussing Radin’s distinguishing of
“purely economic and fungible property loss—for which courts are reluctant to award emotional distress
damages given how easily the property may be replaced—from nonfungible, personal and identifying
property loss—which is not readily replaceable, leaving courts more open to emotional distress damages”).
245. 493 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2021) [hereinafter McLaughlin II].
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The Legislature issued two subpoenas to Misty Ann Giles, Director of
the Montana Department of Administration (DOA),246 another to the Montana Supreme Court Administrator, Beth McLaughlin,247 and even subpoenaed the Justices themselves.248 The subpoenas all essentially pertained to,
and purported to recover, the same information—the substantive results of a
survey that polled select members of Montana’s judiciary.249 The Montana
Judges Association (MJA), through McLaughlin, surveyed its members regarding Senate Bill 140, which the Legislature was considering at the time
the survey was administered and has since been signed into law.250 After
learning of the poll and expressing concern that engagement with the same
could compromise future judicial impartiality, the Legislature requested and
received the final results of the poll from McLaughlin; upon requesting
more, the Legislature learned that some of the MJA member email responses had been deleted in accordance with administrative routine.251 The
subpoenas sought production of all existing and recoverable emails and attachments; although the requests were temporally limited to the time that
the poll was administered, the subpoenas did not indicate a similar limitation with respect to subject matter.252
Following the first subpoena’s issuance and McLaughlin’s subsequent
emergency motion to quash it, the Montana Supreme Court approved a temporary order quashing the subpoena, but not before DOA had already begun
producing documents—with more than 5,000 Judicial Branch emails disclosed to the Legislature in less than one day.253 The day following the
temporary order, the Legislature informed the Court it “does not recognize
this Court’s order as binding and will not abide [by] it. . . . The subpoena is
246. See Petition for Original Jurisdiction and Emergency Request to Quash/Enjoin Enforcement of
Legis. Subpoena at Ex. A, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 489 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 210173), https://perma.cc/79AD-6SV5 (first subpoena demanding production of all emails and documents
sent to or received by McLaughlin over a three-month period) [hereinafter Petition for Original Jurisdiction]; Petitioner’s Notice of Additional Legislative Subpoena at Ex. A, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg.,
489 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/MW8D-WZ3V (second subpoena requiring Giles’s appearance and production of documents by that afternoon).
247. See Emergency Motion to Quash Revised Legis. Subpoena at 3, Brown v. Gianforte, 488 P.3d
548 (Mont. 2021) (OP 21-0125), https://perma.cc/72TL-TBGU.
248. See Motion to Disqualify Justices at 5, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 489 P.3d 482 (Mont.
2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/R9XN-CLDC.
249. McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 489 P.3d 482, 483 (Mont. 2021) [hereinafter McLaughlin I].
250. Id.; see also Brown v. Gianforte, 488 P.3d 548, 560 (Mont. 2021) (upholding the constitutionality of Senate Bill 140, which abolished the Judicial Nominating Commission); cf. J.T. Stepleton, Judging on the Merits: Reconsidering Brown v. Gianforte and the Elimination of the Montana Judicial
Nominating Commission, 83 MONT. L. REV. 379 (2022) (arguing for reconsideration of Brown on the
basis that it contradicts the intentions of the framers of Montana’s 1972 Constitution and neglects to
analyze key “ramification-era documents”).
251. McLaughlin I, 489 P.3d at 483.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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valid and will be enforced.”254 That same day, McLaughlin filed a petition
to permanently enjoin the subpoena’s enforcement.255
Two days later, the Legislature served subpoenas on each individual
Montana Supreme Court justice—informing the justices that they were required to appear before the Legislature and produce various communications to the Legislature, such as those related to any polls sent to members
of the Judicial Branch and any communication among the justices regarding
pending legislation.256
Following the Legislature serving the justices with subpoenas, the
Montana Department of Justice sent additional correspondence to the Court
addressing several points.257 First, this correspondence appeared to notify
the bench of the justices’ individual requirements to respond to the request
of the Special Joint Select Committee on Judicial Transparency and Accountability (the “Special Committee”).258 Second, it fundamentally disputed the temporary order—stating that “[t]he Court here lays claim to sole
authority over provision of due process for all branches of government,
which is ludicrous”—and further insisted that “the entirety of the legislative
session is one giant exercise in due process.”259 Ultimately, every justice
appeared before the Legislature and answered questions relating to the Special Committee’s investigation into alleged judicial misconduct.260
A. McLaughlin I
Before the Court could resolve the subpoena dispute on its merits, the
Court first needed to resolve issues of procedure—in McLaughlin I.261 The
Legislature, through its counsel at the Department of Justice, moved to disqualify the entire bench from hearing the case, challenging whether the justices could maintain neutrality given the Court’s “obvious interest in providing a specific answer to that dusty old legal question about the scope of
legislative subpoena power.”262 McLaughlin opposed the motion on
grounds that “the Legislature simply assumes the Court is corruptible in this
254. Petition for Original Jurisdiction, supra note 246, at Ex. C-2, available at https://perma.cc/
M3ED-QW49.
255. McLaughlin I, 489 P.3d at 484.
256. Id.
257. Correspondence from Lt. Gen. Kristin Hansen to the Justices of the Mont. Sup. Ct. at 1, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 489 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/X6ASWKEF [hereinafter Hansen Correspondence].
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id. (taking the position that while judges are included in the administration of due process,
“their opportunity is limited by their special duty of impartiality in decision-making”).
260. McLaughlin I, 489 P.3d at 485.
261. See id. at 489.
262. Mont. State Leg.’s Petition for Rehearing Regarding the Court’s May 12 Order at 5, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 493 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/8KCK-P9WZ.
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case because it has a relationship with McLaughlin,” and instead advanced
the position that “[c]onfidences in the justices’ integrity ‘cannot exist in a
system that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship or
favor’.”263
In denying the Legislature’s motion, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
Legislature’s blanket request to disqualify all members of this Court appears to be directed to disrupt the normal process of a tribunal whose function is to adjudicate the underlying dispute consistent with the law, the constitution, and due process.”264 The Court further rejected the Legislature’s
argument that “due process does not allow a judge to be a judge in his own
case.”265 The Court determined that the “expansive and overarching nature”
of the Legislature’s investigation would effectively disqualify every Montana judge from adjudicating the substance of these claims.266 Thus, the
Court invoked the Rule of Necessity to conclude that none of the justices
should be disqualified.267 The bench unanimously agreed that the Legislature had issued subpoenas upon them personally to create the appearance of
a conflict, and concluded that “succumb[ing] to the Legislature’s request”
would relieve the Court of its “responsibilities and obligations.”268
After issuing its opinion in McLaughlin I, the Court received correspondence from Attorney General Austin Knudsen, accusing the Court of
making “thinly veiled threats and attacks on the professional integrity of
attorneys” in his office, and further insisted:
[W]hile this dispute is extraordinary and troubling, please refrain from
threatening or maligning the integrity of my attorneys who are assiduously
living up to their ethical obligations under unusual circumstances. If you
wish to vent any further frustrations about the conduct of attorneys in my
office, I invite you to contact me directly.269
263. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Disqualify Justices at 2–3, McLaughlin v.
Mont. State Leg., 489 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/6XPY-XX34 (citing
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2009)).
264. McLaughlin I, 489 P.3d at 486–87.
265. Id. at 486.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 487 (citing 2 H. Rolle, An Abridgment of Many Cases & Resolutions at Common Law 93
(1668) (translation)) (applying the Rule of Necessity to conclude that none of the justices would be
disqualified from adjudicating the case on the merits, and noting the Rule emanated from a 1430 Chancellor of Oxford ruling that “if an action is sued in the bench against all Judges there, then by necessity
they shall be their own judges”).
268. Id. at 489 (with District Judge Donald Harris sitting by designation for Justice Jim Rice, who
had recused himself). See also DOJ Statement on Justice Rice Recusal, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May
5, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/NP37-Z83Q (“Justice Rice reaffirmed his integrity and the fundamental principle of justice–that no one should be the judge in their own case. I hope is colleagues [sic]
on the Supreme Court will exhibit the same courage and character.”).
269. Correspondence from Att’y Gen. Austin Knudsen to the Chief Justice, Assoc. Justices, and
Judge Harris at 2, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 493 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https:/
/perma.cc/4H22-V4YR; see also Mara Silvers, How Austin Knudsen is flipping the script of attorney
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The Legislature continued to maintain that judicial proceedings were not
the proper forum for resolving these disputes,270 and subsequently petitioned for a rehearing, imploring that “the Court must therefore forgive the
Legislature if reasonable doubt persists about the Court’s statements and
ability to fairly adjudicate its dispute.”271
McLaughlin opposed the petition, arguing that the Legislature’s purpose “can only be political because, as a legal matter, it completely fails to
satisfy” the necessary legal standard of review.272 The Court denied the
Legislature’s petition for rehearing,273 agreeing in essence with McLaughlin’s argument that “the petition merely disagrees with the Court’s rationale
and takes a new swing with the same bat.”274
Two weeks later, the Legislature moved to dismiss the action as moot,
on grounds it had rescinded and withdrawn all the subpoenas “as a measure
of good faith that will hopefully encourage the judiciary to interact in good
faith with its sister branch of government.”275 McLaughlin opposed the
Legislature’s motion to dismiss, arguing exceptions to the mootness doctrine rendered the Legislature’s efforts immaterial at this stage of the proceedings.276 McLaughlin noted, “Montana has almost no case law addressing the scope of legislative subpoena power. An answer to the pending legal
questions will benefit state officials . . . .”277
The Court denied the Legislature’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
withdrawal of the subpoenas did not impact the already-existing litigageneral, MONT. FREE PRESS (June 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/F3WL-BV8X (“A notable number of his
fellow attorneys agree that Knudsen has upended the norms and standards of his office. In doing so,
some contend, Knudsen and his staff are undermining the very legal system they are sworn to protect,
with potentially profound consequences. . . . [But according to Knudsen,] ‘Montanans had the chance to
vote for status quo a couple different times in the AG’s race. They didn’t do it. . . . I’m an aggressive
guy. I think people knew what they were voting for with me.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
270. Mont. State Leg.’s Petition for Rehearing Regarding the Court’s May 12 Order, supra note 262,
at 9 (“This interbranch dispute should not be settled judicially . . . .”).
271. Id. at 7.
272. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing at 1, McLaughlin v. Mont. State
Leg., 493 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/LKQ7-XWHA.
273. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing at 1, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 493 P.3d 980
(Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/LFB6-U777.
274. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, supra note 272, at 1.
275. Mont. State Leg.’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot at 2, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 493 P.3d
980 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/RH4M-KREQ.
276. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot at 3, McLaughlin v. Mont.
State Leg., 493 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/M2S7-KR2K (citing Havre
Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre, 142 P.3d 864, 867–79 (Mont. 2006)) (stating that the recognized
exceptions to the mootness doctrine are “public interest,” “voluntary cessation,” and “capable of repetition, but evading review”).
277. Id.
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tion,278 and exhibited skepticism that the issues of the case were fully resolved.279 In its order, the Court stated “[t]he Legislature’s decision to act
first, and deal with the ramifications later, does not allow it to declare the
issue moot when it determines that it has achieved what it wishes.”280
As such, McLaughlin’s petition to quash the subpoenas and enjoin enforcement of the same proceeded for adjudication on its merits.281
B. McLaughlin II
Associate Justice Beth Baker’s unanimous majority opinion had two
primary holdings. First, the Court held that the subpoenas were invalid as a
result of being “impermissibly overbroad,” seeking to “expand the scope of
legislative authority.”282 Second, if the Legislature seeks to subpoena a state
officer’s records, Montana courts “must conduct any needed in camera review and balance competing privacy and security interests” to determine
whether redactions are necessary.283
The Court’s discussion began by noting that the Montana Constitution
contains no specific legislative investigatory power.284 Although this power
has been held to be inherently implied by Article V, Section 1,285 the Legislature here issued subpoenas pursuant to statutory authority.286 Additionally, as the Court noted, “[t]he legislative branch is not a law enforcement
agency; its inquiry must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate
task of the [Legislature].”287 According to the Court, a subpoena serves a
legitimate task, or “valid legislative purpose,” when it concerns “a subject
278. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 2, McLaughlin v. Mont. State Leg., 493 P.3d 980 (Mont.
2021) (No. OP 21-0173), https://perma.cc/6YGR-9N6F.
279. Id. at 4 (citing Mont. State Leg.’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot, supra note 275, at 4).
280. Id. at 3.
281. See McLaughlin v. Mont. State Legislature, 493 P.3d 980, 983 (Mont. 2021).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 983, 996 (quoting Comm’r of Political Practices for Mont. v. Mont. Republican Party,
485 P.3d 741, 745 (Mont. 2021)) (“Whenever a government entity seeks to exercise the power of the
state to compel an individual . . . to relinquish documents or to appear for examination, due process
concerns are necessarily implicated, which in turn necessarily implicates judicial oversight.”).
284. Id. at 984–85.
285. Id. at 985 (citing Opinion No. 60, 43 Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 220, 222 (1990), available at https:/
/perma.cc/3YFV-UHB8); see also Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (citing
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927)) (“This power of inquiry—with processes to enforce
it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
286. McLaughlin II, 493 P.3d at 985 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-5-101(1) (2021) (“A subpoena
requiring the attendance of any witness before either house of the legislature or a committee of either
house may be issued by the president of the senate, the speaker of the house, or the presiding officer of
any committee before whom the attendance of the witness is desired.”)).
287. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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on which legislation could be had.”288 Further, when there is a valid legislative purpose, the subpoena must be “no broader than reasonably necessary
to support [the] legislative objective.”289 Importantly, “investigations solely
conducted for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible. And there is no [legislative] power
to expose for the sake of exposure.”290
The Court observed that the Legislature failed to delineate any legislative purpose in its first subpoena, while the revised and subsequent subpoenas stated three core purposes, none of which the Court found to be sufficient: (1) to determine whether legislation pertaining to the Judicial
Branch’s records retention protocols should be enacted; (2) to determine
whether the Court Administrator performed tasks for the MJA in violation
of law; and (3) to determine whether Montana judges responding to MJA
polls resulted in improper “pre-judging” of issues related to pending legislation.291
The Court disposed of the first purpose after applying the constitutional separation of powers doctrine: “[A]ddressing alleged violations of
existing law is an enforcement matter entrusted to the executive, not to the
legislative, branch of government.”292 The Court similarly found the second
purpose to be invalid, since the Court Administrator “acts within her job
duties when she coordinates contact between district court judges and legislatures or conducts a poll to allow district judges, through the Montana
Judges Association, to provide the legislature with relevant information regarding how proposed legislation will affect Judicial Branch functions.”293
Finally, the Court discarded the third proffered purpose by again applying
the separation of powers doctrine: “To maintain independence of the judiciary, the Constitution commits the oversight of judges to the judicial
branch.”294 The Court further noted the Judicial Standards Commission, not
the Legislature, is tasked with investigating the possibility of judicial misconduct.295
288. Id.
289. Id. at 986 (citing Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2036).
290. Id. (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)).
291. Id. at 988.
292. Id. at 989 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-6-1002(13), 2-6-1012(1)(e), 3-2-402(1)(a) (2021))
(noting that the definition of public information does not include confidential information, and highlighting that the Judicial Branch already has a prescribed records retention policy).
293. Id. at 991 (noting that “district court judges therefore are not ‘lobbying’ when they inform
members of the Legislature how proposed legislation will affect the function of the Judicial Branch”).
294. Id. at 992.
295. Id.; see MONT. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (“A judge shall not make any public statement
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair
trial or hearing.”).
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As to all three purported “valid legislative purposes,” the Court determined the Legislature wholly failed to “adequately identify its claims and
explain how the evidence offered connects to the legislative purpose it puts
forth.”296 In the absence of a valid legislative purpose, the Court further
noted the scope of the subpoenas “sweep far too broadly,”297 and also failed
to “safeguard the process that ordinarily attends the issuance of such compelled process.”298
Finally, the Court addressed the Legislature’s ongoing claim that this
matter was not being resolved in the proper forum.299 The opinion acknowledged that there is “likely” a better “place for discussion among the
branches,” but exploring such an option was foreclosed when the Legislature “resorted to direct subpoena without opening any such discussion with
the Judicial Branch and without even giving notice of the first subpoena.”300
Two concurring opinions accompanied McLaughlin II’s majority decision. Associate Justice Laurie McKinnon specially concurred,301 and indicated she would apply the separation of powers doctrine to substantially
limit the majority’s holding.302 Justice McKinnon reframed the issue as
“whether the legislature seeks to investigate misconduct of the Judicial
Branch,”303 and in answering affirmatively, would reach essentially the
same result since the Legislature’s end goal “clearly does not constitute a
‘valid legislative purpose.’”304 She deprecated the majority for “implicitly
lend[ing] credibility and legitimacy to a legislative act which was blatantly

296. McLaughlin II, 493 P.3d at 992 (citing Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2036
(2020)).
297. Id. at 994.
298. Id. at 995 (citing MONT. R. CIV. P. 45) (discussing that the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
require service of a subpoena “no less than 10 days before the commanded production of information”;
that the party responsible for issuing the subpoena take “reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue
burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena”; and that the subpoena be quashed if it “requires
disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies”).
299. Id. at 996 (“Is there nonetheless, as the Legislature suggests, a place for discussion among the
branches if it desires more dialogue with the Court or information from the Judicial Branch? Likely so.
But that is not what this Petition is about and not what the Legislature suggested when it resorted to
direct subpoena without opening any such discussion with the Judicial Branch and without even giving
McLaughlin notice of the first subpoena.”).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 997 (McKinnon, J., specially concurring).
302. Id. at 1001 (“When addressing a separation of power issue, it is important to understand the
branches are to work together to secure a workable government for its citizens, while respecting each
branch’s autonomy.”).
303. Id. at 997.
304. Id. (emphasis in original).
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designed to interfere with, if not malign, a coequal and independent branch
of government.”305
Associate Justice Dirk Sandefur also concurred, “to call-out what this
recklessly ginned-up ‘crisis’ is truly about.”306 He said these matters are
“not the result of some petty and obscure turf war,”307 but are about “protecting and preserving the existence and integrity of rule of law under the
supreme law of this State for the mutual benefit of all and posterity, regardless of partisan political stripe, agenda, or divide.”308 He proclaimed the
personal and societal freedoms which inherently accompany existence in a
modern civil government would vanquish if not for the “preservation and
respect for the distinct functions of all three co-equal branches of government.”309 Justice Sandefur concluded that society’s form of constitutional
government is “designed to avoid” the fate contemplated by an 1887 adage—that “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”310
On Dec. 6, 2021, the Legislature filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court.311 In March of 2022, the nation’s highest court declined to accept the petition.312
C. Conclusion
At the end of it all, this case boils down to a rather inevitable pair of
familiar concepts: institutional legitimacy313 and judicial review.314 The
305. Id. at 997–98 (outlining the history of legislative abuses perpetrated by the unchecked English
Parliament, and concluding that “[n]ever has a legislative branch of government presumed, until today,
that its investigative authority to summon witnesses and documents was unrestrained, plenary, and unreviewable by the judicial branch for violations of fundamental rights and privileges”).
306. Id. at 1004 (Sandefur, J., concurring).
307. Id. (“Beyond the smoke-screen of the catchy but demonstrably false allegations leveled against
the judiciary is an unscrupulously calculated and coordinated partisan campaign to undermine the constitutional function of Montana’s duly-elected nonpartisan branch to conduct independent judicial review of legislative enactments for compliance with the supreme law of the state—the Montana Constitution.”).
308. Id. (emphasis in original).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1005 (quoting English historian and moralist John Dalberg-Acton).
311. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mont. State Leg. v. McLaughlin, No. 21-859
(U.S. Dec. 6, 2021); Notice of Filing, Mont. State Leg. v. McLaughlin, No. 21-859 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2021).
See also The Editorial Board, Conflicts of Supreme Judicial Interest, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec.
27, 2021, available at https://perma.cc/624N-NFUT (supporting the petition, positing that the conflict in
this instance “couldn’t be clearer,” and urging the U.S. Supreme Court to “reinforce standards of ethical
judicial conduct”).
312. See Notice of Ruling, Mont. State Leg. v. McLaughlin, No. 21-859 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2022).
313. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, ¶ 7 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean’s ed.) (“The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”).
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Legislature posited that, under these circumstances, the two cannot coexist.315 McLaughlin—and more importantly, the Montana Supreme Court—
disagreed. Underlying the McLaughlin decisions is the concept that judicial
review is proper, and its exercise should innately enhance institutional legitimacy. The Court here clearly realized, and respected, the axiomatic principle that a court’s power exists at the behest of public trust.316 As modern
political society has evolved in polarizing ways, this evolution may be evidence that public opinion is “the least dangerous branch[’s]”317 most valuable, yet fleeting, seal of approval.
The Montana Supreme Court admonished the Legislature’s attempt to
circumvent the Montana Constitution, thereby reinforcing its autonomous
power to interpret the same.318 This approach is not unfamiliar to American
political history, as stated by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the
natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute
their WILL to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose,
that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority.319

Montana practitioners, and frankly, the public-at-large, should aspire
for the Judiciary—in Montana and otherwise—to be an institution that fosters and protects widespread public confidence, while also indiscriminately
dispensing due process. Here, while both parties aspire to this utopia, there
is extreme disagreement as to the means through which this end can be
314. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.”).
315. Motion to Disqualify Justices, supra note 248, at 4 (“Members of this Court have an obligation
to promote confidence in the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary . . . but these
actions do precisely the opposite.”).
316. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Disqualify Justices, supra note 263, at
2–3 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 927 (2004)) (“Confidence in the justices’ integrity
“cannot exist in a system that assumes them to be corruptible to the slightest friendship or favor.”).
317. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 313, ¶ 7 (“Whoever attentively considers the different
departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other,
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”).
318. McLaughlin v. Mont. State Legislature, 493 P.3d 980, 994 (Mont. 2021) (applying a constitutional doctrine of law—separation of powers—to conclude that “enforcement of the law is not a ‘legitimate task’ of the legislative function” under the Montana Constitution).
319. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 313, ¶ 12.
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reached and maintained. Which of these means is more desirable, preferable, or endurable remains to be seen. McLaughlin I and II help reinforce
that the Montana Supreme Court—much like the rest of the legal profession—remains largely autonomous, continuously endeavoring to “emphatically . . . say what the law is.”320
—Marti A. Liechty

320. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 177.
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